



Modeling a Bulletin Board Service based on Broadcast Channels with Memory

Severin Hauser and Rolf Haenni

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Outline

- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Broadcast Channel With Memory
- ▶ Bulletin Board Service
- ▶ Conclusion

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The Secure MPC Perspective

- ▶ The “voting problem” can be formulated as a secure multi-party computation (MPC) problem
 - ▶ Parties (voters) P_1, \dots, P_n with private inputs $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$
 - ▶ Common output $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \sum_i x_i$
- ▶ Properties of secure MPC protocols
 - ▶ Privacy
 - ▶ Correctness
 - ▶ Independent inputs
 - ▶ Output delivery
 - ▶ Fairness
- ▶ Formal security definition based on ideal/real-model paradigm

Known Results from MPC Research

- ▶ Let $t \leq n$ be the number of corrupted parties
- ▶ For $t < \frac{n}{2}$
 - ▶ Secure MPC protocols exist for any function f
 - ▶ Even for computationally unbounded adversaries
 - ▶ Precondition: broadcast channel
- ▶ For $t \geq \frac{n}{2}$
 - ▶ Secure MPC protocols (without output delivery and fairness) exist for any function f
 - ▶ Only for polynomially bounded adversaries
 - ▶ Precondition: broadcast channel

Cryptographic Voting Protocols

- ▶ General MPC protocols are not applicable to real-world elections
 - ▶ Inefficient for large electorate
 - ▶ Limited connectivity of voters (vote-and-go)
 - ▶ No broadcast channel among voters
- ▶ Therefore, e-voting research focuses on designing specialized cryptographic voting protocols with additional parties such as
 - ▶ Election administration
 - ▶ Voting server
 - ▶ Independent authorities (of which at least some are honest) for tasks such as mixing or threshold decryption
 - ▶ Verifiers

which communicate over point-to-point channels

Verifying an Election

- ▶ A precondition for verifying an election is a consistent view of the “election data”
- ▶ This is a Byzantine agreement problem, which can be solved using **reliable broadcast protocols**
- ▶ Same problems as general MPC approach
 - ▶ Inefficient for large number of parties
 - ▶ Limited connectivity of parties during protocol execution
- ▶ Therefore, several voting protocols in the literature refer to a **broadcast channel with memory (BCM)**
 - ▶ Memorization of all submitted messages
 - ▶ Delayed delivery
- ▶ Problem: no formal definition in literature

Outline


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Ideal Channel

- ▶ A distributed system $\mathcal{D} = (\Omega, \Gamma)$ consist of:
 - ▶ Set of parties $\Omega = \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$
 - ▶ Set of ideal channels $\Gamma = \{c_1, \dots, c_m\}$
- ▶ Ideal means:
 - ▶ instantaneous transmission
 - ▶ unlimited capacity
 - ▶ noiseless
 - ▶ total message ordering
- ▶ Every channel $c \in \Gamma$ defines:
 - ▶ Sender domain $S_c \subseteq \Omega$
 - ▶ Receiver domain $R_c \subseteq \Omega$
 - ▶ Message domain \mathcal{M}_c

Message Transmission

- ▶ If $s \in S_c$ transmits $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$ over c to R_c by calling $s : \text{Send}_c(m)$
then every $r_i \in R_c$ receives m instantaneously
- ▶ Parties $p \in \Omega \setminus R_c$ can observe the transmission of m over c , but do not learn anything about m (except possibly its length)
- ▶ Parties $p' \notin \Omega$ can not even observe the transmission of m



Special Cases

	Ω	S_c	R_c
Broadcast channel	–	–	Ω
Public channel	–	Ω	–
Public broadcast channel	–	Ω	Ω
Authentic channel	–	$\{s\}$	–
Authentic broadcast channel	–	$\{s\}$	Ω
Confidential channel	–	–	$\{r\}$
Secure channel	–	$\{s\}$	$\{r\}$
Untappable channel	$\{s, r\}$	$\{s\}$	$\{r\}$

Channel with Memory

- ▶ A channel with memory $c \in \Gamma$ keeps track of all messages
- ▶ $\mathbf{M}_c = \langle m_1, \dots, m_t \rangle$ is called channel history of $c \in \Gamma$, i.e.

$$\mathbf{M}_c \leftarrow \mathbf{M}_c || m$$

is updated each time a message m is transmitted over c

- ▶ Sender $s \in S_c$ transmits $m \in \mathcal{M}_c$ over c to R_c by calling

$$\text{Send}_c(m)$$

- ▶ At any time, receiver $r_i \in R_c$ obtains current \mathbf{M}_c by calling

$$\mathbf{M}_c \leftarrow \text{Receive}_c()$$

Broadcast Channel with Memory

- ▶ A channel with memory $c \in \Gamma$ is called broadcast channel with memory (BCM), if $R_c = \Omega$
- ▶ In e-voting protocols, voters use public BCM ($S_c = \Omega$) and authorities use authentic BCM ($S_c = \{s\}$)
- ▶ If $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \Omega$ denotes a collection of BCMS, then $\mathbf{M}_{\mathcal{C}}$ denotes the joint channel history of all channels
- ▶ Verification in an e-voting protocol relies on checking the integrity/consistency/plausibility/validity of the data included in $\mathbf{M}_{\mathcal{C}}$

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Ideal BCMs in the Real World

- ▶ Ideal BCMs do not exist in the real world
 - ▶ Transmission is not instantaneous
 - ▶ Messages can be lost or altered during transmission
 - ▶ Capacity is limited
 - ▶ Ambiguous message ordering
 - ▶ Stateless (no memory)
- ▶ In the real-world, ideal BCMs can at best be approximated
- ▶ For example by a **bulletin board service (BBS)**, which is responsible for tracking the **board history** **B**

Bulletin Board Service

- ▶ To eliminate a BCM $c \in \Gamma$ from a distributed system (Ω, Γ) , some additional **bulletin board parties** Φ are added

$$\Omega' = \Omega \cup \Phi$$

- ▶ Their goal is to offer jointly a bulletin board service to all parties from Ω
- ▶ Additionally, Ψ contains the channels necessary for connecting the parties from Ω with the bulletin board parties from Φ

$$\Gamma' = (\Gamma \setminus \{c\}) \cup \Psi$$

- ▶ Actual protocol run on (Ω', Γ') instead of (Ω, Γ)

Functionality

- ▶ Instead of broadcasting m over c , pairs $p = (m, \alpha)$ is posted to the BBS
 - ▶ p is send to one or multiple bulletin board parties
 - ▶ $\alpha =$ meta-data (e.g. for authentication)
- ▶ In general, posts are processed in blocks $b = (\{p_1, \dots, p_s\}, \beta)$
 - ▶ Board history update: $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow \mathbf{B} || b$
 - ▶ $\beta =$ publication evidence (e.g. signed hash chain header)
- ▶ Block size s determines **publication mode**
 - ▶ Buffered publication (s is fixed)
 - ▶ Immediate publication ($s = 1$)
 - ▶ Periodical publication (block added after some time)

Properties

- ▶ Authentication: only parties from S_c can post messages
- ▶ Non-Discrimination: all parties from S_c can post messages
- ▶ Well-Formedness: only messages from \mathcal{M}_c are accepted
- ▶ Ordering: correct message order in board history
- ▶ Uniqueness: list of recorded messages is unique
- ▶ Completeness: all recorded messages are returned

Basic Roles

- ▶ The bulletin board parties may have different roles:
 - ▶ Collectors: receive the incoming messages
 - ▶ Disseminators: return the board history (upon request)
 - ▶ Broadcasters: broadcast information about board history (e.g. a signed hash chain header)
 - ▶ Associates: support the BBS in achieving its properties
- ▶ Some of the bulletin parties may act as **trustees** in the usual sense (a threshold number of honest trustees suffices for maintaining the service)

Special Cases

- ▶ Single-party BBS (e.g. Helios, UniVote, ...)
- ▶ Multi-party BBS
 - ▶ Byzantine agreement protocols
 - ▶ Blockchain-based public ledger
- ▶ vVote system bulletin board
 - ▶ Collectors: peers
 - ▶ Disseminator: WBB
 - ▶ Broadcaster: publisher

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Conclusion

- ▶ Formal definitions of broadcast channels
 - ▶ Authentic broadcast channel
 - ▶ Public broadcast channel
 - ▶ Broadcast channel with memory
- ▶ Informal definition of bulletin board service
 - ▶ Extension of general channel model
 - ▶ Covers several existing bulletin board implementations
 - ▶ Proposal of (informal) properties
- ▶ Work in progress ...