

Mobivote - Decentralized E-Voting on Android Devices

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Who we are

- Jürg Ritter

- ▶ Master student at BFH
- ▶ part time student
- ▶ affiliated to the BFH e-voting research group
- ▶ employed in the industry (Swisscom)



- Philémon von Bergen

- ▶ Master student at BFH
- ▶ full time student
- ▶ affiliated to the BFH e-voting research group



Who we are

- The E-Voting group belongs to the Research Institute for Security in the Information Society (RISIS) of the BFH
- Currently staffed with
 - ▶ 4 professors
 - ▶ 1 PhD student
 - ▶ 1 research assistant
 - ▶ 2 master students

Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Technologies we use
- 3 Live demo
- 4 Cryptographic protocols
- 5 Challenges
- 6 Discussion

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Introduction

The problem

- Most current approaches for e-voting require some sort of central infrastructure
- This means we usually need to do careful planning of a voting session
- Trusted parties are required

Introduction

Idea behind the project

- Provide secure e-voting in a more spontaneous manner
 - ▶ Remove the central infrastructure
 - ▶ Participants become trustees
- Use mobile devices (tablets, smartphones)
- Use proximity as a secondary channel
 - ▶ Visual communication
 - ▶ Oral communication
- Targeted market: meetings where decisions need to be taken, for example
 - ▶ Board of directors in a company
 - ▶ General meeting of associations
 - ▶ ...

Introduction

Goal of the project

- Build a decentralized e-voting system on Android devices (smartphones and tablets)
- Uses WLAN as communication layer
- No internet access required
- Has to be usable without great knowledge about security
- Supports up to 20 participants
- Supports one-out-of-n votes
- Two master theses implementing two different cryptographic protocols

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Technologies we use

- Android
- AllJoyn as messaging bus [1]
- NFC and QR-codes
- UniCrypt library for protocol cryptography [2]



UniCrypt



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Live demo

- Protocols not implemented yet
- Please cross fingers for us, you are beta testers! ;-)

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- CGS97 [3] (Jürg)
 - ▶ A Secure and Optimally Efficient Multi-Authority Election Scheme
- A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast [1] (Philémon)

- Protocol due to Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers
- Setup
 - ▶ Administrator defines the question and the possible options of the vote
 - ▶ Trustees generate an asymmetric ElGamal keypair, where the private key is split among all trustees
 - ▶ Transcript of key generation is posted on the bulletin board
- Voting Phase
 - ▶ Voters pick an option, encrypt it using the public key and post it to the bulletin board along with a proof of validity
- Tallying
 - ▶ Using the homomorphic property of ElGamal encryption, the encrypted ballots on the bulletin board are summed up
 - ▶ Trustees collaborate in order to decrypt the encrypted result and post the final result on the bulletin board, along with zero knowledge proofs

A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview

- Authors: Khader, Smyth, Ryan, Hao, 2012
 - ▶ Extension of "Anonymous Voting by Two-round Public Discussion" (Hao, Ryan, Zieliński, 2008) [2]
- 3 or 4 rounds of message exchange and a tally round
- Zero knowledge proofs assure verifiability
- Uses homomorphic tallying

A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview


1



A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview

2




Red: private values

A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview

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
Red: private values

Green: published values

A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview

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Red: private values


Green: published values

Black: computed values

A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview

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Red: private values


Green: published values

Black: computed values

A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview

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
Red: private values

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A Fair and Robust Voting System by Broadcast

Brief overview




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Brief overview



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
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Challenges

- Decentralized communication is not easy to set up
- Trade-off security / usability
- Robustness in many situations
- Android Wifi API
- Bootstrapping of a secure group communication

Challenges

Bootstrapping of a secure group communication

- How to check the origin of a message (authentication) ?
 - ▶ Each participant sends a RSA public key to allow others to verify the signature of the messages he sent
 - ▶ When two different public keys are received for the same participant, an error is thrown

Challenges

Bootstrapping of a secure group communication

- Communication privacy
 - ▶ AllJoyn default groups are public, so everybody can connect to a group
 - ▶ This increases the risk of impersonification or DoS attacks
 - ▶ So we use AES encryption of messages exchanged on the network
 - ▶ AES key is derived from a password that has been exchanged using a channel based on proximity
 - Visually (QR Code, display password)
 - Orally (somebody reads password)
 - Pass around a piece of hardware containing the password (NFC token)

Challenges

Bootstrapping of a secure group communication

- Key for AES encryption
 - ▶ In order to avoid rainbow table attacks on the password used for AES key derivation, we have to use a dynamic salt
 - ▶ The salt is transmitted over the network
 - ▶ An attacker could inject a different salt (DoS attack)
 - ▶ We include 3 chars of the salt's hash in the password in order to verify correctness of the salt

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Discussion

Wrap-up

- We are trying to use e-voting approaches for a new use case
- Centralized component
 - ▶ to control the flow of the voting process
 - ▶ to manage the message exchange
- The e-voting protocols are still decentralized
- Protocols make some assumptions that are not always trivial to implement

Discussion

Next steps

- Next steps
 - ▶ Split up in separate projects
 - ▶ Implementation of the protocols
 - ▶ Extension to other mobile devices (future projects)

Discussion

Feedback

- Are there...
 - ▶ any questions?
 - ▶ any remarks?

Thanks

- Thank you for your attention !

References

- ▶ AllJoyn
In the Internet of Everything, AllJoyn Enables the “Internet of Things Near You”.
Qualcomm Innovation Center
- ▶ UniCrypt
Cryptographic library (not ready for production at this point)
BFH E-Voting Group
- ▶ R. Cramer, R. Gennaro, B. Schoenmakers
A Secure and Optimally Efficient Multi-Authority Election Scheme
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- ▶ D. Khader, B. Smyth, P.Y.A Ryan, F. Hao
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- ▶ F. Hao, P.Y.A Ryan, P. Zieliński
Anonymous Voting by Two-round Public Discussion
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