

Why Public Boards are Required in E-Voting Systems Based on Threshold Blind Signature

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Blind Signature Voting Scheme
- 3 Multiple Authorities
- 4 Attack on Democracy
- 5 Solution
- 6 Conclusion

Why This Talk?

Default blind signature schemes...

- ...are simple and understandable
- ...are used in many E-Voting / E-Cash Protocols
- ...bear a severe **weakness**
if used within a **threshold protocol**

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Voters Will



The voter...

- ...gets the ballot...
- ...declares the will onto the ballot.



Voters Will



The voter...

- ...gets the ballot...
- ...declares the will onto the ballot.

Blinding




Vote for one option:

- Joe Smith
- John Citizen
- Jane Doe
- Fred Rubble
- Mary Hill

The voter...

- ...blinds the vote for the voting authority...

Blinding



The voter...

- ...blinds the vote for the voting authority...

Blinding



The voter...

- ...blinds the vote for the voting authority...

Blinding



The voter...

- ...blinds the vote for the voting authority...

Blinding



The voter...

- ...blinds the vote for the voting authority...



Blinding Vote

Blinding



The voter...

- ...blinds the vote for the voting authority...

Voter - Signing



The voter...

- ...signs the blinded vote...


Voter - Signing



The voter...

- ...signs the blinded vote...

Transmission



The voter...

- ...sends the blinded vote to the authority.

Verifying the Eligibility



The authority...

- ...verifies the eligibility of the voter...
- ...by consulting and updating the voter roll...


Verifying the Eligibility



The authority...

- ...verifies the eligibility of the voter...
- ...by consulting and updating the voter roll...


Verifying the Eligibility



The authority...

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Verifying the Eligibility




The authority...

- ...verifies the eligibility of the voter...
- ...by consulting and updating the voter roll...

Granting the Right to Vote

Authority - Signing



The authority...

- ...blindly signs the vote in the envelope...

Authority - Signing




Receiver:



The authority...

- ...blindly signs the vote in the envelope...

Transmission



The authority...

- ...sends the blindly signed vote back to the voter.

Unblinding



The voter...

- ...unblinds the vote...
- ...is ready to cast an authorized anonymous vote.

Unblinding



The voter...

- ...unblinds the vote...
- ...is ready to cast an authorized anonymous vote.

Unblinding



The voter...

- ...unblinds the vote...
- ...is ready to cast an authorized anonymous vote.

Unblinding



Vote for one option:

<input type="checkbox"/>	Joe Smith
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	John Citizen
<input type="checkbox"/>	Jane Doe
<input type="checkbox"/>	Fred Rubble
<input type="checkbox"/>	Mary Hill


Authorization:

The voter...

- ...unblinds the vote...
- ...is ready to cast an authorized anonymous vote.

Transmission



The voter...

- ...sends the authorized vote to the ballot box...

Vote Casting



The ballot box...

- ...accepts the authorized vote. (E2E-Verifiable)

Scheme Overview



Standard RSA-Blind Signature Scheme

Definition

$V = \text{Voter}$

$v = \text{Vote}$

$A = \text{Authority}$

$e, m = \text{Public key of signing authority}$

$B = \text{Ballot box}$

$d = \text{Private key of signing authority}$

$r = \text{Random blinding factor}$

Scheme (everything mod m)

$V \rightarrow A : v' = vr^e$

$V \leftarrow A : s' = v'^d = v^d r^{ed} = v^d r$

$V : s = s' r^{-1} = v^d r r^{-1} = v^d$

$V \rightarrow B : (v, s)$

Scheme in Action

A list of some protocols use this scheme:

A. Fujioka et al A practical secret voting scheme for large scale elections. Advances of Auscrypt'92, LNCS 718:244?251, 1992.

T. Okamoto An electronic voting scheme. Proceedings of IFIP'96, pages 21?30, 1996.


Zhe Xia, Schneider S.A. (2007) A New Receipt-Free E-Voting Scheme Based on Blind Signature (Abstract) , laVoSS Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (WOTE) , 2006

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Single Point of Failure




Only one single...

- ...authority
- ...ballot box

Multiply

Multiple Ballot Boxes




The replication of the...

- ... ballot box does not affect blind signature scheme

Multiply

Multiple Authorities (Needs complete scheme re-design)



The replication of the...

- ...authority requires complete re-design of the signature scheme

Threshold Distributed Computation

Single Voting Authority



Vote for one option:

Joe Smith

John Citizen

Jane Doe

Fred Rubble

Mary Hill


Authorizations:

Instead of a single...

- ...authority...
- ...authority signature vote

Threshold Distributed Computation

... a multiple...



Multiple Instances...

- of authorities are needed.

Threshold Distributed Computation

Amount of Required Signatures for n authorities

Is the protocol safe against...



Failure

Boycott

Masquerade

Threshold Distributed Computation


Amount of Required Signatures for n authorities

Is the protocol safe against...

 1 out of n	Failure	Boycott	Masquerade
	Yes	Yes	No
	No	No	Yes
	Yes	Yes	Yes

Threshold Distributed Computation

Ballot For Threshold Voting Authorization



Vote for one option:

- Joe Smith
- John Citizen
- Jane Doe
- Fred Rubble
- Mary Hill



Authorizations:

Threshold

- ... authority signature vote. (i.e. Less signatures required than authorities available)

Voting / Blinding



The voter...

- ...votes...

- ...blinds the vote for an arbitrary chosen authority...

Voting / Blinding



The voter...

- ...votes...
- ...blinds the vote for an arbitrary chosen authority...

Signing / Sending



The voter...

- ...signs the blinded vote
- ...sends it to the chosen authority.


Signing / Sending



The voter...

- ...signs the blinded vote
- ...sends it to the chosen authority.


Requesting Authorization



The authority...

- ...verifies the eligibility of the voter...
- ...by consulting and updating the voter roll...


Requesting Authorization



The chosen authority...

- ...blindly signs the vote in the envelope...
- ...sends the blindly signed vote back to the voter.

Requesting Authorization




The chosen authority...

- ...blindly signs the vote in the envelope...
- ...sends the blindly signed vote back to the voter.

Granting the Right to Vote

Requesting Authorization




This procedure is repeated...

- ...with other arbitrary chosen authorities...

- ...until the authorization-signature threshold is reached

Requesting Authorization



This procedure is repeated...

- ...with other arbitrary chosen authorities...
- ...until the authorization-signature threshold is reached

Requesting Authorization



Vote for one option:

Joe Smith

John Citizen

Jane Doe

Fred Rubble

Mary Hill



Authorization:

This procedure is repeated...

- ...with other arbitrary chosen authorities...
- ...until the authorization-signature threshold is reached

Modified Threshold RSA-Blind Signature Scheme

Definition

$V = \text{Voter}$

$v = \text{Vote}$

$A_i = \text{Authority}$

$e_i, m_i = \text{Public key of signing authority}$

$B = \text{Ballot box}$

$d_i = \text{Private key of signing authority}$

$r = \text{Random blinding factor}$

Scheme

$V \rightarrow A_1 : v'_1 = vr^{e_1}$

$V \leftarrow A_1 : s'_1 = v'^{d_1} = v^{d_1} r^{e_1 d_1} = v^{d_1} r$

\vdots

$V \rightarrow A_t : v'_t = vr^{e_t}$

$V \leftarrow A_t : s'_t = v'^{d_t} = v^{d_t} r^{e_t d_t} = v^{d_t} r$

$V \rightarrow B : (v, \{s_1, \dots, s_t\})$ where $s_i = s'_i r^{-1} = v^{d_i} r r^{-1} = v^{d_i}$

Scheme in Action

A list of some protocols use this scheme:

B. W. DuRette Multiple administrators for electronic voting. Bachelor thesis, Massachusetts (EVOC) Institute of Technology, Boston, USA, 1999.

R. Joaquim, A. Zuquete, and P. Ferreira REVS a robust electronic voting system. In IADIS International Conference e-Society 2003, pages 95103, Lisbon, Portugal, 2003

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Colluding Voters



Imagine...

- 3-voters collude (whereas 3 is our sample threshold out of $n=4$)
- 3-voters create 4 valid votes.

Knowledge

What the Authorities Know




After round 1

- 3 out of 4 authorities signed for voter 1
- 3 out of 4 authority do 'know' about voter 1

Knowledge


What the Authorities Know



After round 3

- 3 out of 4 authorities signed for voter 3
- only 1 authority 'knows' about all voters

Breaking Democracy



After round 4

- The colluding three voters have a fourth vote signed
- 3 Voters Generated 4 Valid Votes

Knowledge

Breaking Democracy



After round 4

- The colluding three voters have a fourth vote signed
- **3 Voters Generated 4 Valid Votes**

Impact on Democracy

Definition

v_+ = Amount of additional valid votes

N = Amount of authorities available

t = Threshold (Amount of authorities needed to get a valid vote)

V_c = Amount of colluding voters

In general

$$v_+ = \lfloor \frac{N-t}{t} V_c \rfloor$$

In our example, where $N = 4$ and $t = \frac{3}{4}N = 3$ and $V_c = 3$

$$v_+ = \frac{V_c}{3} = 1$$

In an example, where $t = \frac{2}{3}N$ and $V_c = 1000$

$$v_+ = \frac{V_c}{2} = 500$$

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Public Bulletin Board



Common knowledge

- The knowledge of each authority must be universally accessible

Graph of Knowledge



Common knowledge

- The public board manages the voter roll

Granting The Right to Vote



The voter...

- ...transfers the blinded vote to the public board


Granting The Right to Vote



The public board...

- ...accepts one vote per voter only

Granting The Right to Vote



The authorities...

- blindly sign the vote on the public board

Granting The Right to Vote



The authorities...

- blindly sign the vote on the public board

Granting The Right to Vote



The voter...

- ...copies the blindly signed vote from the public board
- ...casts the signed vote.

Granting The Right to Vote



The voter...

- ...copies the blindly signed vote from the public board
- ...casts the signed vote.

Granting The Right to Vote



Every eligible voter...

- ...gets the signature this way

Granting The Right to Vote



After 3 rounds 3 voters...

- ...voted and can not do so a fourth time.

Granting The Right to Vote



After 3 rounds 3 voters...

- ...voted and can not do so a fourth time.

Modified threshold RSA-blind signature scheme maintaining democracy

Possible Threshold-Aware RSA-Blind Signature Scheme (using the same blinding-factor for every signer)

$$V \rightarrow PB : v' = v r^{e_1 \cdots e_N}$$

$$PB \leftrightarrow A_1 : s'_1 = v'^{d_1} = v^{d_1} r^{e_1 \cdots e_N d_1} = v^{d_1} r^{e_2 \cdots e_N} = v^{d_1} R_1$$

$$\vdots$$

$$PB \leftrightarrow A_t : s'_t = v'^{d_t} = v^{d_t} r^{e_1 \cdots e_N d_t} = v^{d_t} r^{e_1 \cdots e_{t-1} \cdots e_N} = v^{d_t} R_t$$

$$V \leftarrow PB : \{s'_1, \dots, s'_t\}$$

$$V : s_1 = s'_1 r^{-(e_2 \cdots e_N)} = v^{d_1} R_1 R_1^{-1} = v^{d_1}$$

$$\vdots$$

$$V : s_t = s'_t r^{-(e_1 \cdots e_{t-1} \cdots e_N)} = v^{d_t} R_t R_t^{-1} = v^{d_t}$$

$$V \rightarrow B : (v, \{s_1, \dots, s_t\})$$

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Conclusion

Findings

- Blind signature schemes (RSA as well as ElGamal) are ready for single authority signature for any information
- E-Voting protocols are not allowed to contain any single point of failure
- Maintaining democracy in threshold blind sig. schemes requires every authority to provably sign the very same information
- It is possible to render the blind signature schemes safe for democracy by using a public bulletin board

BUT: The prized simplicity of blind signature schemes does not longer hold true.